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Abstract 
People differ in their implicit beliefs about emotions. Some believe emotions are fixed 
(entity theorists), while others believe that everyone can learn to change their emotions 
(incremental theorists). We extend the prior literature by demonstrating: (1) entity 
beliefs are associated with lower well-being, and increased psychological distress, (2) 
people’s beliefs about their own emotions explain greater unique variance than their 
beliefs about emotions in general, and (3) implicit beliefs are linked with well-
being/distress via cognitive reappraisal. These results suggest people’s implicit beliefs – 
particularly about their own emotions – may predispose them towards emotion 
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The ability to adaptively regulate emotion is crucial for healthy functioning, and 
many psychological disorders involve some kind of emotion dysregulation (Werner & 
Gross, 2009). This observation has fueled interest in the consequences that different 
emotion regulation strategies have for well-being and psychological health (Aldao & 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 2012; Gross, 2007; Webb, Miles & Sheeran, 2012).  
One emotion regulation strategy that has a broadly adaptive profile is reappraisal. 
This cognitive form of emotion regulation involves changing the way one thinks about an 
emotion-eliciting situation in order to change its emotional impact (Gross & Thompson, 
2007). While it is true that reappraisal can be used in ways that are beneficial or 
detrimental, in general, reappraisal is considered an effective emotion regulation strategy 
for decreasing negative, and increasing positive emotions in the present moment (Goldin 
et al., 2009). Habitual use of reappraisal as an emotion regulation strategy is also 
associated with higher levels of positive, and lower levels of negative affect and 
depressive symptoms, as well as improved interpersonal functioning, self-esteem, and 
satisfaction with life (Gross & John, 2003).   
Despite reappraisal's many advantages, not everyone makes use of this strategy in 
day-to-day life. Why is this? We hypothesize that one important determinant of emotion 
regulation use is the beliefs people hold about the nature of the emotions they experience. 
In particular, not all people view emotions as things that can be controlled (Tamir, John, 
Srivastava & Gross, 2007). Some people believe that you cannot really change the 
emotions that you experience (entity theorists), while others believe that everyone can 
learn to control or regulate their emotions (incremental theorists). These beliefs – about 
the controllability or malleability of particular attributes such as emotions – are also 
referred to as ‘implicit theories’ (see Dweck, 1999 for a review). While limited research 
exists on implicit beliefs about emotion, these beliefs have been studied in other domains.  
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Implicit Beliefs Across Domains 
Work by Dweck and colleagues indicates that people hold implicit beliefs about 
the fixed or malleable nature of a wide range of abilities and traits including: intelligence 
(Blackwell, Trzesniewski & Dweck, 2007), personality (Erdley et al., 1997; Chiu, Hong 
& Dweck, 1997), athletic ability (Chen et al., 2008; Ommundsen, 2001), social skills 
(Rhodewalt, 1994), relationships (Knee, 1998; Knee, Patrick & Lonsbary, 2003), memory 
(Werth & Förster, 2002), fame (Maltby et al., 2008), and even one’s morality or the 
nature of the world in general (Chiu, Dweck, Tong & Fu, 1997). Compared to 
incremental theorists (who believe in the potential for change), people holding entity 
beliefs typically believe in the fixed, unchanging nature of these attributes and traits.  
These beliefs have important implications for self-regulation as well as social and 
emotional functioning. For example, research indicates that people holding entity beliefs 
often make global positive and negative trait judgments about people based on their 
actions and are also more likely to blame or condemn these personal qualities when they 
or others encounter setbacks (Chiu, Hong & Dweck, 1997; Gervey, Chiu, Hong & 
Dweck, 1999). Because entity theorists believe their weaknesses cannot be improved, 
they are also vulnerable to disengagement and helplessness (Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Lin & 
Wan, 1999; Ommundsen, et al., 2005; Rhodewalt, 1994), poorer coping strategies under 
stress (Doron, Stephan, Boiche & Le Scanff, 2009), reduced self-esteem (Rhodewalt, 
1994), and more negative affect over time (Tamir et al., 2007; Robins & Pals, 2002).  
Implicit Beliefs About Emotions 
In the context of implicit beliefs about emotions, Tamir et al. (2007) found that 
these beliefs have important consequences for students during the transition to college. In 
a large longitudinal study with undergraduates, students holding entity beliefs about 
emotions reported fewer positive and more negative emotional experiences, as well as 
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increased feelings of depression, loneliness, and isolation from their peers. Other recent 
research with undergraduates has linked different kinds of beliefs about emotions (e.g., as 
overwhelming, shameful, and damaging) with clinical indications of anxiety and 
depression (Manser, Cooper, & Trefusis, 2012).  
While these findings highlight the importance of various emotion beliefs, what is 
not yet clear is why beliefs about emotions have these affective and social correlates. 
One possibility is that implicit beliefs about emotions are linked with key emotion 
regulation tendencies. In particular, implicit beliefs may be one factor that explains 
individual differences in the use of adaptive emotion regulation strategies like 
reappraisal. When people believe that emotions cannot readily be controlled, they may be 
less inclined to use intentional cognitive strategies (like reappraisal) to regulate their 
emotions in daily life. Research with undergraduates (Tamir et al., 2007) found that prior 
to college, students holding entity beliefs about emotions do indeed report using 
reappraisal less frequently than their incremental counterparts. The potential mediating 
role of reappraisal however, has not yet been explored.  
A second important gap in the literature has to do with the way that implicit 
beliefs are assessed. Traditionally, implicit beliefs have been measured by asking people 
to indicate how much they agree with statements describing a certain attribute either as a 
fixed or malleable trait. For example, in the domain of emotions: “No matter how hard 
they try, people can’t really change the emotions that they have”. While these domain-
general beliefs predict a wide range of outcomes, it is not clear if, and to what extent, 
people’s general beliefs about emotions differ from their beliefs about their own personal 
ability to change or control the emotions they experience. Because personal and domain 
specific beliefs are typically better predictors of goals, attributions, motivation and 
performance (Bandura, 1997; 2006; De Castella & Byrne, 2012), a first-person measure 
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of people’s implicit beliefs about their own emotion may serve as an even better predictor 
of emotion regulation, well-being, and psychological distress. 
The Current Study 
Our goal was to extend initial findings by Tamir et al. (2007) by examining the 
relationship between implicit beliefs about emotion and emotion regulation, well-being, 
and psychological distress. We were also interested in examining how people’s beliefs 
about the controllability of emotions in general might differ from their beliefs about the 
controllability of their own emotions. We expected (H1) entity beliefs about emotions 
would be associated with lesser use of reappraisal, lower levels of well-being (reduced 
self-esteem and satisfaction with life), and increased psychological distress (stress and 
depression). For each outcome, we predicted (H2) people’s beliefs about their ability to 
control their own emotions (personal beliefs) would be a better predictor than their 
beliefs about the controllability of emotions in general (general beliefs). Finally, we 
expected that (H3) that implicit beliefs would be related to well-being/psychological 
distress via reappraisal frequency.   
 
Methods 
Participants and Procedure 
 Participants consisted of 216 undergraduate psychology students (67% female) 
from Stanford University. Students ranged from 17 to 29 years of age (M = 19.1, SD = 
1.6). The sample consisted of 45% White Caucasian, 12% Chinese, 8% South/East Asian, 
8% Hispanic, 8% African American, 6% Mixed, 5% Indian, 4% Mexican, and 3% Other. 
Students were invited to participate in exchange for course credit. All students were 
informed that participation was voluntary, that they could withdraw at any time, and that 
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there were no right or wrong answers. They were also informed that the information 
would be kept confidential.   
Measures 
Implicit Beliefs about Emotions  
General beliefs about the malleability of emotions were assessed with the 4-item 
Implicit Beliefs about Emotion Scale (Tamir et al., 2007). Two items measured 
incremental beliefs, e.g., “If they want to, people can change the emotions that they 
have,” “Everyone can learn to control their emotions,” and two measured entity beliefs, 
e.g., “The truth is, people have very little control over their emotions,” “No matter how 
hard they try, people can’t really change the emotions that they have”. Participants were 
asked to rate their agreement on a 5-point Likert scale. Incremental theory items were 
then reverse-scored and averaged with higher scores reflecting an entity theory and lower 
scores an incremental theory of emotions. In past research with undergraduates, the scale 
showed good internal consistency (α = .75, Tamir et al., 2007).  In the present sample, 
internal consistency was .77. 
Personal beliefs about the malleability of emotions were assessed using a variant 
of the original 4-item measure (Tamir et al., 2007). All items were modified to reflect a 
first-person claim about the extent to which one could personally change or control their 
emotions. Efforts were made to ensure items stayed closely aligned to the originals. Items 
were as follows: “If I want to, I can change the emotions that I have,” “I can learn to 
control my emotions,” “The truth is, I have very little control over my emotions,” and 
“No matter how hard I try, I can’t really change the emotions that I have.”  In the present 
sample, internal consistency was .79. 
Both scales were treated as continuous variables. This approach is consistent with 
previous research (Plaks & Stecher, 2007; Robins & Pals, 2002; Tamir et al., 2007) and 
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avoids loss of power associated with typologizing dimensional variables (Cohen, 1983). 
For ease of interpretation, we refer to those with higher scores as holding entity beliefs 
and those with lower scores as holding incremental beliefs. Psychometric properties of 
these four implicit theories of emotion scale are presented in Table 1. 
Emotion Regulation 
Cognitive reappraisal use was assessed using the 6-item cognitive reappraisal 
scale from the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross & John, 2003) (e.g., 
“When I want to feel less negative emotion, I change the way I’m thinking about the 
situation”). Responses are rated on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Research indicates that the scale is internally consistent 
(values ranging from .83 to .86, Moscovitch et al., 2011) and displays strong convergent 
and discriminant validity (Gross & John, 2003). In the present sample, internal 
consistency was .89. 
Well-Being 
Self-esteem was assessed using The Single-Item Self-Esteem Scale (SISE; 
Robins, Hendin & Trzensniewski, 2001). The SISE asks subjects to rate their agreement 
with the following item: “I have high self-esteem”. Responses are recorded on a 5-point 
Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Research with the 
SISE indicates that the scale is reliable and displays good criterion validity across a wide 
range of measures. For this reason it has been presented as a practical alternative to the 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES) in adult samples (Robins et al., 2001).  
Life satisfaction was measured using the 5-item Satisfaction With Life Scale 
(SWLS; Diener, Emmons, Larsen & Griffin, 1985).  The SWLS is a commonly used 
measure of life satisfaction (e.g., “In most ways my life is close to ideal”). Items are rated 
on a 7-point Likert scale with total scores ranging from 5 to 35. Research indicates the 
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scale is internally consistent and displays good test-retest reliability (Pavot & Diener, 
1993; Pavot, Diener, Colvin & Sandvik, 1991).  In the present sample, internal 
consistency was .89. 
Psychological Distress 
 Stress was measured with the 4-item Perceived Stress Scale (PSS-4; Cohen, 
Kamarck & Mermelstein, 1983). The PSS-4 asks about the extent to which life situations 
are appraised as stressful over the past month (e.g., “I felt that difficulties were piling up 
so high that I could not overcome them”). Items are scored on a 4-point Likert scale 
ranging from 1 (rarely or none of the time) to 4 (most or all of the time). Total scores 
range from 4 to 16. The PSS-4 has been shown to be a reliable and internally consistent 
measure of stress (Hewitt, Flett, & Mosher, 1992). In the present sample, internal 
consistency was .81. 
Depressive symptoms were measured using the Center for Epidemiological 
Studies Depression Scale (CES-D; Radloff, 1977). The CES-D is a 20-item self-report 
scale and is widely used as measure of depressive symptoms among adults (Radloff, 
1977) and adolescents (Radloff, 1991) in the community. Participants are asked to rate 
the frequency of various thoughts and feelings over the last week (e.g., “I felt hopeful 
about the future” and “I had crying spells”). Responses are recorded on a 4-point Likert 
scale ranging from 0 (rarely or none of the time) to 3 (most or all of the time). Total 
scores range from 0 to 60 with scores of 15 and above indicative of mild to moderate 
depression. Research with the CES-D indicates that it is internally consistent and displays 
good construct validity and test-retest reliability (Radloff, 1977).  In the present sample, 
internal consistency was .91. 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
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Prior to analysis, all variables were examined for missing values and 
distributional assumptions of multivariate analysis. Of the total sample, 8 surveys were 
left blank or incomplete (missing data > 10%) and were excluded from the analysis. This 
reduced the total sample to 208. Across all variables, missing data were rare (< 1%), and 
were imputed with the overall mean for that variable – a conservative technique in such 
cases (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). As in previous work on implicit theories (Tamir et al., 
2007), beliefs about emotion were not significantly related to gender or ethnicity and 
these variables are not discussed further. Means (M), standard deviations (SD), ranges, 
internal consistencies (α), and correlations for all variables are presented in Table 1.  
Hypothesis 1: Links to Emotion Regulation, Well-Being, and Psychological Distress 
Consistent with H1, both the general and personal scales demonstrated significant 
correlations with emotion regulation, well-being, and psychological distress. Entity 
beliefs were associated with lower levels of cognitive reappraisal, self-esteem, and 
satisfaction with life, and higher levels of stress and depression.  
[Table 1 about here] 
 A within-subjects t-test between the general and personal scales was used to 
examine whether people’s general beliefs about emotions differed significantly from their 
appraisal of their own emotions. Consistent with previous research (De Castella & Byrne, 
2012), people endorsed entity beliefs less on the personal measure (MPersonal = 9.66, MGeneral 
= 10.37, t(208) = 4.98, p < .001, d = .26), indicating greater perceived control over their 
own emotions.  
Hypothesis 2: Personal vs. General Scale 
To examine whether personal beliefs explained greater variance in emotion 
regulation, well-being, and psychological distress, when compared to general beliefs (H2), 
we conducted a series of two-step hierarchical regression analyses to examine the unique 
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variance explained by each scale. For each dependent variable, we tested two models. In 
the first model, the general scale was entered first, followed by the personal scale in the 
second step. In the second model, this pattern was reversed to control for the variance 
explained by the personal scale. To avoid problems associated with multicollinearity, 
variables were first centered by subtracting the mean (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Table 2 
displays the standardized regression coefficients (β), R2 and R2 change for the full and 
restricted models in each analysis.  
[Table 2 here]. 
Both scales accounted for a significant portion of variance in all variables. The 
belief that emotions were fixed predicted decreased use of reappraisal, increased 
psychological distress (stress and depression), and decreased well-being (lower self-
esteem and satisfaction with life). The personal scale consistently explained unique 
variance on these measures over and above the general scale. The general scale however, 
failed to contribute unique outcome variance when controlling for the personal measure. 
Hypothesis 3: The Indirect Effect of Reappraisal 
To test whether implicit beliefs would be related to well-being/psychological 
distress via cognitive reappraisal (H3), we examined the indirect effect of implicit beliefs 
via reappraisal using separate analyses for each of our dependent variables (self-esteem, 
satisfaction with life, stress, depression).  
Specifically, using the Preacher and Hayes (2008) SPSS macros for indirect 
effects, we conducted a bootstrap of 5,000 samples and generated an empirically derived 
sampling distribution; confidence intervals were derived from this distribution and used 
to test for significance of the indirect effect. Unlike other traditional tests of mediation, 
such as the Sobel test (1982, 1986) and those presented by Baron and Kenny (1986), the 
bootstrap method does not assume standard errors are normally distributed and does not 
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compromise statistical power with multiple tests. It is also the preferred approach for 
small-to-medium samples (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). In all analyses, we used the 
personal measure of implicit beliefs about emotion. Gender, age and ethnicity were not 
associated with implicit beliefs, reappraisal, or any of the dependent variables.  
Results indicated that the indirect effect of emotion beliefs via cognitive 
reappraisal was significant in each analysis with 95% confidence intervals excluding 
zero: self-esteem (ab = -.03, 95% CI = [-.06, -.01]); satisfaction with life (ab = -.24, 95% 
CI = [-.47, -.10]); stress (ab = .07, 95% CI = [.02, .14]), and depression (ab = .31, 95% CI 
= [.10, .67]).  
[Figures 1 and 2 here].  
Secondary Analyses 
In addition to testing the proposed causal model, we tested 3 alternative models of 
indirect effects: 1) Reverse causation – well-being and clinical symptoms linked with 
entity beliefs via reappraisal 2) Entity beliefs predicting reappraisal via well-being and 
clinical symptoms and, 3) Reappraisal predicting well-being and clinical symptoms via 
entity beliefs. Model 1 was significant for all DVs except depression. Model 2 was 
significant for all DVs. For model 3, the indirect effect of reappraisal via entity beliefs 
was only significant for stress and depression and not for self-esteem or life satisfaction.     
Analyses of indirect effects were also repeated to examine the unique contribution 
of the personal and general emotion belief scales in predicting each of the dependent 
variables. Consistent with H2 in each analysis, the effect of personal beliefs via 
reappraisal was significant when controlling for general beliefs about emotions (all CIs 
excluding 0). And, in each analysis, the effect of general beliefs via reappraisal was not 
significant when controlling for personal beliefs about emotions (all CIs including 0).  
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Discussion 
Despite a great deal of research on implicit beliefs in social and educational 
psychology (Blackwell et al., 2007; Chiu, Hong & Dweck, 1997; Hong, Chiu, Dweck, 
Lin & Wan, 1999; see Dweck 1999 for a review), very little is known about how various 
types of implicit beliefs might be related more broadly to clinical symptoms and 
psychological health. The primary aim of the current study was to extend findings 
reported by Tamir et al. (2007) by examining people’s beliefs about their own emotions 
and possible links to emotion regulation, well-being, and psychological distress. Findings 
indicated that the more people endorsed entity beliefs about emotions, the less likely they 
were to use reappraisal in daily life. Entity beliefs about emotions were also associated 
with decreased well-being (reduced self-esteem and satisfaction with life) and increased 
psychological distress of stress and depression – results that were partly explained by 
differences in peoples’ use of reappraisal.  
Implications for Implicit Beliefs 
Results from the current study indicate that people’s beliefs about their ability to 
control their own emotions are an even better predictor of well-being and psychological 
distress than their beliefs about emotions in general. This was true both in explaining 
variance in the dependent variables (H2) and in using the two scales to test the indirect 
effect of reappraisal (H3). The personal scale may thus offer theoretical and practical 
advantages over the general scale in research on emotion regulation and affective 
functioning. Given similar findings with implicit beliefs about one’s own intelligence (De 
Castella & Byrne, 2012), the development of other personal scales may also have 
potential in many areas where self-efficacy and ability attributions play a key role.  
It also bears noting that on average, people scored higher in their endorsement of 
incremental items when asked about their ability to control their own emotions, and 
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displayed higher endorsement of entity items when considering emotions as a broader 
construct. These results suggest that domain-general beliefs are not necessarily a 
precursor of subsequent beliefs about one’s personal abilities as suggested by Tamir and 
colleagues (2007). The results are also consistent with research in non-clinical settings on 
positive illusions, self-presentational biases, and self-enhancing contrast effects 
(Gramzow, Elliot, Asher & McGregor, 2003; Story & Dunning, 2002; Taylor & Brown, 
1998; 1994; Taylor & Armor, 1996). The belief that emotions are ‘more malleable’ for 
the self than others may thus reflect another way in which people seek to boost self-
esteem and enhance or protect a positive self-concept.  
Recognizing that there may be discrepancies between people’s broader implicit 
beliefs and their beliefs about themselves may become particularly important in the 
context of treatments and interventions. Research on implicit beliefs about intelligence 
indicates that while people’s beliefs are often stable, simple interventions can lead to 
long-lasting effects (Aronson et al., 2002; Good, Aronson & Inzlicht, 2003; Blackwell et 
al., 2007). Much of this work has taught incremental beliefs to students explicitly through 
messages, case studies, and vignettes (Bergen 1992), or indirectly through letter writing 
tasks, feedback, praise, and criticism (Kamins & Dweck, 1999; Muller & Dweck, 1998). 
Other interventions have also sought to teach an incremental theory through videos, 
mentoring, and letter writing tasks (Aronson et al., 2002; Good et al., 2003), workshops 
(Blackwell et al., 2007), and computer programs like Brainology (2010). While these 
interventions teach people about their potential for change and growth, results from the 
current study suggest knowing that change is possible for some is not the same as 
believing in one’s ability to personally change. The extent, then, to which incremental 
beliefs are personally internalized may determine how, and for whom, this message is 
most effective. 
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Implications for Emotion Regulation 
In addition to extending research on implicit beliefs, these results may have 
important implications for work on emotion regulation and psychopathology.  The 
current study examined emotion beliefs, cognitive reappraisal, and clinical outcomes in 
an undergraduate sample. However, the relationship between implicit beliefs, reappraisal, 
and psychological distress indicates that these beliefs may potentially have an important 
role to play in the etiology and subsequent treatment of clinical disorders.  
Emotion dysregulation is a core feature of many Axis I and Axis II disorders 
(Gross, 1998b) and training in emotion regulation strategies like cognitive reappraisal is a 
key component of many forms of psychotherapy (Werner & Gross, 2009). However, the 
strategies patients ultimately use to regulate their emotions – and whether they even make 
such attempts at all – may be linked to the implicit beliefs they hold about their ability to 
control the emotions they experience. This is an important area for future investigation as 
it may have substantial impact on treatment. 
Our results indicate that cognitive reappraisal may be an important intervening 
variable between people’s beliefs about their emotions and their general psychological 
health and well-being. While these findings begin to explain how implicit beliefs operate, 
there may also be other mechanisms at play. For example, people holding entity beliefs 
about their emotions might also be more likely to avoid situations that could arouse a 
strong negative reaction. They might also seek to modulate their physiological reactions 
by more readily turning to prescription or recreational drugs, tobacco, alcohol or caffeine.  
Recent work by Berking et al. (2012) indicates that a wide range of skills are 
involved in emotion regulation and coping, for example: emotional awareness and 
identification; interpretation of sensations; understanding of emotional triggers; and a 
willingness to confront and respond compassionately to oneself in distressing situations. 
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Interestingly, in their research with both students and psychiatric inpatients, the 
relationship between these skills and reductions in psychological distress was mediated 
by how effectively subjects were able to modify their negative emotions. The process 
model of emotion regulation (Gross & Thompson, 2007) points to a wide range emotion 
regulation strategies available to people at different stages in the emotion generation 
process. Given that many features of psychopathology involve poorly implemented, 
inflexible or context-insensitive strategies (Werner & Gross, 2009), we believe that an 
examination of the relationship between implicit beliefs and different emotion regulation 
strategies will be a fruitful area for future research. One exciting avenue for future work 
in this area might involve using longitudinal methods to examine whether existing forms 
of psychotherapy lead to reliable long-term shifts in patients’ implicit beliefs about their 
own emotions and whether these changes are predictive of emotion regulation strategies 
and treatment outcomes. Experimentally manipulating patients’ perceived control over 
their emotions would also provide greater evidence for the causal role these beliefs play 
in emotion regulation and psychological health.  
Limitations and Future Directions  
The current study represents an important first step towards understanding the 
role of implicit beliefs in psychological health, and well-being. However, several 
limitations should be noted.  
First, despite our large sample it is important to note that data collected in the 
current study are self-reports and based on a student sample. As with much of the 
research on implicit beliefs in other domains (see Dweck, 1999), this limits 
generalizability beyond non-clinical student samples. Given that implicit beliefs about 
emotions may have important clinical implications, we believe future work in adult 
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community samples and clinical populations may improve our understanding of the role 
these beliefs play in psychological illness.  
A second limitation relates to measurement. In the current study, we included a 
variety of clinical and well-being indicators, and focused on reappraisal as a variable that 
might explain links between implicit beliefs and these outcomes. However, it may also be 
interesting to examine whether implicit beliefs orient people towards other emotion 
regulation strategies that have more or less adaptive consequences. Future research might 
consider possible links between implicit beliefs and other emotion regulatory strategies 
such as situation selection and response modulation, as well as the possibility of 
incorporating a wider variety of measures that assess psychological distress and well-
being. This work would be strengthened with the inclusion of data from multiple sources 
– such as independent evaluations, psychophysiological assessments, and behavioral 
tasks. 
A final limitation relates to the causal relationship among variables. The current 
study has identified important links among implicit beliefs about emotion, emotion 
regulation strategies, well-being, and psychological distress. We have presented a model 
in which implicit beliefs about emotion guide emotion regulation strategies, which in turn 
have important consequences for well-being and psychological health. This model is 
theoretically motivated and consistent with a large body of research on implicit theories 
(Aronson et al., 2002; Blackwell et al., 2007; Good, Aronson & Inzlicht, 2003; Muller & 
Dweck, 1998; Tamir et al., 2007). It also fits nicely with research on the impact of 
reappraisal on affect and emotional experience (e.g., Gross, 1998a; John & Gross, 2004; 
Jamieson, Nock, & Mendes, 2012; Rood, Roelofs, Bogels, & Arntz, 2012; Wolgast, 
Lundh, & Viborg, 2011). None the less, it is important to recognize that the cross-
sectional nature of this study makes it impossible to establish clear causal relationships 
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between variables. For example, entity beliefs about emotion may also reflect existing 
deficiencies in emotion regulation or lead to poorer well-being and psychological health 
which in-turn impact on people’s ability to use cognitive reappraisal as a strategy to 
regulate their emotions. Bi-directional relationships of this kind may be particularly 
important in the context of clinical disorders like depression where cognitive biases and 
neural dysfunction are also associated with difficulties implementing cognitive regulation 
strategies (Foland-Ross & Gotlib, 2012; Johnstone et al., 2007).  According to Social 
Cognitive Theory – which underpins much of the work on implicit theories – personal, 
behavioral and environmental factors mutually influence one another in a bidirectional, 
reciprocal fashion. This assumption – often referred to as triadic reciprocal determinism – 
does not detract from the important and often causal role of belief change in this process 
(Bandura, 1997).  
Despite these limitations, the current study makes a number of important 
contributions to the fields of social and clinical psychology. Consistent with findings 
reported by Tamir et al. (2007), our results suggest that not all people view emotions as 
things that can be controlled. Those who do, however, are more likely to use adaptive 
emotion regulation strategies like cognitive reappraisal in daily life and this, in turn, 
partly accounts for their increased levels of well-being and decreased psychological 
distress. These findings suggest that the implicit beliefs that people hold – particularly 
about their emotions – may have important implications for emotion regulation and 
experience. Understanding where these beliefs come from and how they may be altered 
promises to be a constructive area for future research.   
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics, Cronbach’s Alphas, and Correlations  
^p<0.05 *p<0.01 ** p < 0.001  
    Correlations 
Variable M SD Range α 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. General Entity Beliefs  10.37 2.76 4.00 – 20.00 .77 1 .73** -.26** -26** -.18* .31** .15^ 
2. Personal Entity Beliefs  9.66 2.82 4.00 – 20.00 .79  1 -.34** -.37** -.24** .38** .27** 
3. Cognitive Reappraisal  30.44 5.78 10.00 – 70.00 .89   1 .34** .37** -.33** -.38** 
4. Self-esteem 3.60 1.01 1.00 – 5.00 -    1 .53** -.51** -.43** 
5. Satisfaction with life  26.54 6.09 5.00 – 35.00 .89     1 -.57** -.48** 
6. Stress 7.09 2.49 4.00 – 16.00 .81      1 .67** 
7. Depression  26.75 8.00 0.00 – 60.00 .91       1 
BELIEFS ABOUT EMOTIONS 28 
 
Table 2  
 
The Personal vs. General Implicit Beliefs About Emotion Scales: Hierarchical Multiple 
Regressions Predicting Reappraisal Use, Well-Being, and Psychological Distress 
 
  β   
Dependent Variable and Step Step Final R2 R2 Change 
Reappraisal Use     
1. General Entity Beliefs -.26** -.01 .06**  
 Personal Entity Beliefs  -.34** .11** 05** 
2. Personal Entity Beliefs -.34** -.34** .11**  
 General Entity Beliefs  -.01 .11** .00 
Well-being 
Self Esteem     
1. General Entity Beliefs -.26** .01 .06**  
 Personal Entity Beliefs  -.37** .13** .07** 
2. Personal Entity Beliefs -.37** -.37** .13**  
 General Entity Beliefs  .01 .13** .00 
Life Satisfaction      
1. General Entity Beliefs -.18** -.01 .03**  
 Personal Entity Beliefs  -.24** .05** .02* 
2. Personal Entity Beliefs -.24** -.24** .05**  
 General Entity Beliefs  .01 .05** .00   
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Psychological Distress  
Stress     
1. General Entity Beliefs .31** .07 .09**  
 Personal Entity Beliefs  .33** .14** .05** 
2. Personal Entity Beliefs .38** .33** .14*  
 General Entity Beliefs  .07 .14* .00 
Depression     
1.  General Entity Beliefs .15* -.10 .02*  
  Personal Entity Beliefs  .34** .07** .06** 
2.  Personal Entity Beliefs .27** .34** .07**  
  General Entity Beliefs  -.10 .07** .00 
 
**p < .001 * p < .05 Beta is the standardized regression coefficient. Adjusted R2 values and increments for R2 
Change significance levels are based upon F tests for
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Figure 1. 
The indirect effect of entity beliefs about emotions on well-being via reappraisal      
 
Figure 1. Values are standardized coefficients. When controlling for cognitive reappraisal use, the regression coefficient for the effect of implicit 
beliefs (in parentheses) decreases to non-significance for satisfaction with life but remains significant for self-esteem.   
**P < .001 
 
  
Self-esteem R2adj= .18 Personal  Entity Beliefs   
Reappraisal Use -.34** .25** 
-.37**(-.28**) 
Satisfaction with Life R2adj= .14 Personal Entity Beliefs   
Reappraisal Use -.34**  .33** -.24**(-.13) 
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Figure 2.  
The indirect effect of entity beliefs about emotions on psychological distress via reappraisal    
 
Figure 2. Values are standardized coefficients. The regression coefficient for the effect of implicit beliefs (in parentheses) decreases when 
controlling for cognitive reappraisal but not to non-significance.  




Stress R2adj= .19  Personal Entity Beliefs   
Reappraisal Use -.34**  -.23** .38**(.30*) Depression R2adj= .16 Personal  Entity Beliefs   
Reappraisal Use -.34**  -.32** .27**(.16^) 
